Qualification

I have long been an adherent to the policy of 'put up or shut up'--it's a good way to avoid being misunderstood when serious questions need answering.

Foreign policy is one of those places where serious questions need careful answers because even ambiguity carries meaning. An amorphous policy can be colored either strong or weak depending on previous activity or intangibles such as the perceived character of a foreign policy team (headed in America by the President and the Secretary of State).

And so the USS John McCain tails the North Korean vessel...to what end? If the United States intends to do something concrete about making sure proliferators like North Korea can't get away with it, then the United States will have to buck up and take the risk of war (by boarding the Kang Nam).

With large-scale engagements still active in Iraq and Afghanistan, America hardly wants to open a war with North Korea--that's rational at least. But why half-heartedly attempt to curb North Korean proliferation?

To sum up: intercepting the Kang Nam is only a good decision if we intend to follow through and board the ship. If what North Korea has insisted is really true (that such a confrontation would be an act of war), it might start bombarding Seoul, yes. I doubt that North Korea will risk that, but if it does, the United States should respond with clear force on the really valuable military targets. We could start by bombing all of the known nuclear sites and missile launchers.

If all that sounds like a bit more than we're willing to manage, then trailing the Kang Nam isn't a good idea after all.

So we've got to ask ourselves: how badly do we want North Korea to stop threatening the world? Alternately, how much of a commitment problem do we have?

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